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Following Turkey’s application for EU membership in 1987, a Customs Union (CU) between 
Turkey and the EU, mainly covering trade in manufacturing goods and processed agricultural 
products, came into effect in 1995. In addition to a large agricultural sector, Turkey also 
specializes in the production and exportation of relatively low-price, low-quality varieties of 
manufactured products. We use a theoretical framework in order to demonstrate that these 
features of the Turkish economy imply asymmetric changes in the trade volumes of the 
incumbent countries of the EU as a result of the EU-Turkey CU. By examining disaggregated 
trade data we find that the technologically sophisticated EU countries (e.g., mainly the 
Northern European countries) are also least similar to Turkey in terms of their export 
structure, whereas the degree of export similarity between the less technologically 
sophisticated EU members and Turkey is high. Our econometric results indicate that, in 
contrast to the “Northern” group’s exports to other EU15 countries (which have remained 
intact), the Southern countries’s exports to the other EU15 countries have declined as a result 
of the EU-Turkey CU. Moreover, the extra penetration of the Turkish market by EU countries 
has not been more favourable to the Southern group. These findings also imply that 
technologically sophisticated countries may see no significant further benefits from Turkey’s 
full accession to the EU (whereas the migration and political influence related costs for these 
countries may be large). 
JEL Code: F13, F15. 
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The starting point of Turkey’s involvement with the EU goes back to 1959, shortly 
after the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), when Turkey applied 
to become an associate member. The result of this was the Ankara Agreement, which 
is considered as the basis of EU-Turkish relations. The Ankara Agreement aimed to 
strengthen economic and trade relations between the EEC and Turkey and contribute 
to Turkey’s development through the eventual establishment of a customs union. 
Signed on September 12, 1963, and put into effect on December 1, 1964, the 
Agreement pledged to consider Turkey for full membership if and when it could prove 
its capacity to undertake the responsibilities set out in the Agreement. Much like the 
Athens Agreement signed with Greece in 1961, the Ankara Agreement, in principle, 
sought to prepare Turkey for full membership through economic integration.  
 
The culmination of 30 years of commercial association (which it had many ups and 
downs – see the following section for more details) was solidified with the EU-Turkish 
customs union (CU) agreement in March 1995, which came into effect in January 
1996. In Helsinki, in December 1999, the European Council decided to grant Turkey 
(which had applied for full EU membership in 1987) the official status of an accession 
candidate. The European Council considered at that point that Turkey had the basic 
features of a democratic system but displayed serious shortcomings in terms of human 
rights and the protection of minorities. With these issues in mind, in December 2002 
the Copenhagen European Council concluded that the European Council of December 
2004 should decide on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the 
Commission whether Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria (i.e., that a 
candidate should be “a stable democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law, and 
the protection of minorities”) and whether the EU would open accession negotiations 
with Turkey. In October 2004 the European Commission concluded that Turkey fulfils 
the Copenhagen criteria, and at the December 2004 Brussels European Council it was 
decided that accession negotiations will open with Turkey in October 2005. 
   3
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the (possibly differential) effects of the EU-
Turkey CU agreement of 1995, and on the basis of this to gauge the future likely 
impact of the Turkish accession to the EU. The existing literature on the effects of the 
CU agreement has focused mainly on the likely impact of the CU agreement on the 
Turkish economy. Mercenier and Yeldan (1997) conclude, on the basis of a calibrated 
intertemporal general equilibrium model, that the impact of the CU on the Turkish 
economy will be negative due to the terms of trade deterioration which will result from 
the larger drop in the tariff rates which Turkey had to implement (given that the 
existing EU tariffs on Turkish exports were already low)
1. Mercenier and Yeldan 
calculate also the likely effects for Turkey resulting from full EU membership and find 
them to be positive since that would involve the elimination of non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) which would have significant pro-competitive effects on the Turkish economy. 
On the opposite side, Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1997) concluded that CU 
agreement would result in rather significant gains for the Turkish economy, to the 
order of 1% to 1.5% of Turkish GDP, mainly due to the fact that the trade diversion 
involved for Turkey would be rather small since the EU common external tariff which 
it would have to adopt stood only at about 2% for non-agricultural goods.  
 
To our knowledge the only study that has tried to estimate the effects for both the EU 
countries and Turkey is Lejour and De Mooij (2004). On the basis of a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model for the world economy, they calculate the effects of 
(i) Turkey’s accession to the internal European Market, (ii) institutional reforms in 
Turkey triggered by EU-membership; and (iii) migration in response to the free 
movement of workers. They find that the effects of Turkey’s accession to the single 
market are substantial and positive for Turkey, small but positive for the 10 countries 
that have recently acceded to the EU and negligible for the EU(15). Moreover, the 
sectoral effects for the EU countries are not expected to be large. It is predicted that the 
agricultural, textile and wearing apparel sectors will suffer a small decline in the EU 
countries  (although this decline will be mostly concentrated in the Southern countries 
of EU15 and in the 10 new members), whereas the Chemicals, Metals and Transport 
Equipment sectors are predicted to marginally expand in the EU countries. 
                                                 
1 In a similar vein Erzan and Filiztekin (1997) questioned the ability of the small- and medium-scale 
Turkish enterprises to withstand the competitive pressure (at least in the short-run) that the CU would 
bring about.           4
 
In the present study we argue that the salient features of both the EU(15) countries and 
Turkey are conducive to making the effects of the EU-Turkey CU asymmetric. In 
order to support our argument we present two models: the first one assumes that 
international trade involves the exchange of homogeneous goods, whereas the second 
model assumes that trade involves the exchange of vertically differentiated products. 
The first model generates the prediction that the more similar is the export structure of 
an incumbent country with the joining country, the larger will be the crowding-out of 
this country’s exports to the other incumbent countries as a result of the CU 
expansion
2. The second model generates the prediction that the more contiguous an 
incumbent country is to the joining country in terms of technological sophistication, 
the larger will be the crowding-out of this country’s exports to the other incumbent 
countries as a result of the CU expansion.  
 
In the empirical section of the paper we investigate whether the EU-Turkey CU 
produced the type of asymmetric effects on the EU15 countries’s exports identified 
above. To this purpose we use the gravity model of international trade, which has 
during the last decade established itself as the workhorse for many empirical 
investigations in international economics. Even though many authors have used the 
gravity framework in order to analyse  various issues relating to regional trade 
agreements, the possibility of asymmetric effects of CU expansion on the exports of  
incumbent countries to other CU members  has –to our knowledge-  not been studied 
before(see Greenaway and Milner, 2002, for a survey). Our strategy is to, first, use the 
gravity model in order to infer the “normal” amount of Turkish manufacturing exports 
to the EU15, which would obtain during the 1996-2002 period, in the absence of the 
CU agreement. We then calculate  the difference between actual Turkish exports and 
our estimation of “normal” Turkish exports, and identify this as our measure of the 
extra Turkish exports to the EU15 caused by the CU agreement. The influence of this 
measure on the exports of each EU15 country to the rest of the EU15 countries is then 
assessed by estimating a gravity model under two assumptions: first that the effect of 
the CU agreement is symmetric across the EU15 countries, and, second, that the effect 
                                                 
2 The effects of the CU expansion on the welfare of each country (traditionally measured as the sum of 
changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus and government revenue) are also discussed in this 
section.    5
is asymmetric. We find that the CU agreement has adversely affected the exports only 
of those EU countries whose export structure is most similar to Turkey’s and have the 
lowest level of technological sophistication (we term this group South), whereas for 
the rest of the EU countries (the North) the effect has been both economically 
negligible and statistically insignificant.  In addition, we find that the increase in the 
Northern group’s exports to Turkey (above what the gravity model would deem 
“normal”), was higher than the corresponding variable for the South. Both of these 
findings suggest, much as in the case of a single country whose factors of production 
are differentially affected by trade liberalization, that the inter-country effects of the 
EU-Turkey CU have been asymmetric and in accordance with our theoretical 
framework.    
 
From Ankara to Brussels
3  
 
The Ankara Agreement in 1963 specified that the process of economic integration 
between Turkey and the EEC, which would prepare Turkey for full membership to the 
Community, should involve three stages: the preliminary stage, the transition stage 
and the final stage.  During the preliminary stage, which was to be from 1964 to 1973, 
the EEC would give some direct financial aid to Turkey and establish preferential trade 
conditions with Turkey. The transition stage was supposed to last for 22 years, during 
which the Community and Turkey would eliminate all tariffs and trade barriers in 
order to establish a customs union between Turkey and the Community.  At the final 
stage, if sufficient progress were to be observed, the Community would examine the 
possibility of Turkey’s accession to the Community as a full member. 
 
The preliminary stage was completed in five years without any problems and Turkey 
took the necessary steps to initiate the second stage of the Assosiation Agreement. 
During, the transitional stage, which was aimed at setting the timetable towards the 
establisment of a CU between the parties by 1995, the Additional Protocol, was signed 
in 1970, but came into effect in January 1973. The Additional Protocol covered 
Turkey's and the EEC's trade and financial commitments to each other. After the 
Additional Protocol was signed, the EEC abolished tariffs and equivalent taxes (as of 
                                                 
3 This section borrows heavily from Togan (1995), Togan (1997), Hartrel and Laird (1999), European 
Commission (2002), Flam (2003), Hughes (2004), and Ulgen and Zahariadis (2004).    6
September 1971) on industrial imports from Turkey, with the exception of certain 
sensitive products such as machine woven carpets, cotton yarn and cotton textiles. The 
EEC also removed all quantitative restrictions on industrial imports from Turkey with 
the exception of restriction on imports of cocoons and raw silk. However, it did 
continue to apply quotas and minimum import prices which were within the 
framework of the Common Agricultural Policy. With these actions, the EEC had 
fulfilled most of its obligations during the transition period. However, its non-tariff 
barriers against some of the goods in which Turkey (presumably) had comparative 
advantage (e.g., textiles, iron and steel, raisins, fresh fruits and vegetables) has been 
one of the main problems between Turkey and the EU.  
 
During the first four years of the transitional period (1973-1976), the implementation 
of the Additional Protocol went ahead as planned. However, after 1976, the process of 
implementing the Additional Protocol came to a virtual standstill since Turkey was 
unable to reduce the tariffs as planned. In January 1977, Turkey postponed the first 
step of her scheduled tariff alignment with the Common Customs Tariff. One year later 
she also postponed the third round of tariff reductions (Togan, 1995). During the 
period 1976-1987 the Turkey-EEC relations were strained. The first disappointment 
emerged after the first oil crisis, as rising unemployment in Europe limited labour 
movements from Turkey to the member states, demonstrating the Community's 
inability to comply with the provisions of the Additional Protocol concerning the free 
mobility of labour. Another major problem sprang from the extension of concessions 
by the EEC to many LDC's under the General System of Preferences,more 
importantly, under the Mediterranean Policy which considerably eroded the 
preferences granted to Turkish agriculture and industry. In addition, the economic (oil) 
crisis in 1973 and the 1987 Single European Act were the major concerns of the 
Community that made the Community very cautious in eliminating tariffs and other 
trade barriers with Turkey, especially in textile and agricultural products. 
 
On 14 April 1987 Turkey formally applied for full EEC membership. Many observers 
considered this to be a premature application. However, the Community did not want 
to alienate Turkey. Hence, the Commission prepared its official “Opinion” and issued 
it in December 1989. In February 1990, the EC member states concluded on the basis 
of the 'Opinion' of Commission that it would be inappropriate for the Community,   7
which was in a state of flux, to become involved in new accession negotiations.  The 
completion in 1995 of the CU, in accordance with the provision of the Agreement was 
considered by the Commision to be of prime importance for increased interdependence 
and integration between Turkey and the Community. At a meeting of the Association 
Council at ministerial level on 9 November 1992 both sides agreed to restart the 
implementation of the provision laid down in the Association Agreement. Until the 
end of the 1995, Turkey fulfilled all her tariff reductions which was mentioned in 
twelve and twenty two years lists in the Additonal Protocol. On March 1995, it was 
agreed at the Association Council meeting in Brussels, that Turkey would join the 
European Customs Union.  
 
The CU came into force in January 1996. As a member of the CU, Turkey, eliminated 
all custom duties, quantitative restrictions, and all charges which have equivalent effect 
to quantitative restrictions for industrial products and processed components of 
agricultural products in its trade with the EU and adopted the common external tariff 
against third country imports.
4 However, the CU has developed in to a more 
comprehensive concept than the framework defined by the Ankara Agreement and the 
Additional Protocol. This is a unique, and highly complex, agreement since it involves 
a customs union between an existing regional trading block and an independent 
country. The CU between Turkey and the EU goes far beyond a basic custom union 
with free international trade and common external tariffs and has given new impetus to 
the liberalizarion process in Turkey. Apart from the liberalisation of tariffs and 
adoption by Turkey of the EU’s common external tariff for industrial products and the 
industrial components of processed agricultural products, the agreement also embraces 
a number of integration elements; these include the adoption of the Community’s 
commercial policy towards third countries including textile quotas, the adoption of the 
free trade agreements with all the EU’s preferential partners including EFTA, Central 
and Eastern European and Mediterranean countries; co-operation on the harmonisation 
of agricultural policy, mutual minimisation of restriction on trade in services, 
                                                 
4 As a consequence of the CU, Turkey’s weighted tarif rates on imports of industrial products 
originating from the EU15 and EFTA countries have fallen from 5.9% to 0% and from 10.8% to 6% for 
similar goods originating from third countries. With the implementation of the Uruguay Round 
reductions, Turkey’s average rates for third countries will be lowered to 3.5%. The implication of this is 
that as far as tariff barriers are concerned, the relative preference given to EU goods has not increased.  
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harmonisation of Turkey’s legislation to that of the EU in the area of competition 
policy, state aids, anti-dumping, intellectual and industrial property rights, puplic 
procurement and technical barriers to trade.  
 
The scope of the CU, however, excludes Turkey from some of the crucial aspects of 
the common market: the common agricultural policy, including the free circulation of 
agricultural products and the free movement of labour and capital. The 1995 agreement 
also allows for the continuation of contingent protection (anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties) and safeguards – which is in marked contrast to the Europe 
Agreements where trade defence measures are eliminated. Furthermore, Turkey did 
not receive anything resembling the financial assistance granted to the Cental and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs), whereas the EU retains significant leeway for 
the continuation of various technical barriers to trade. 
 
In Table 1 we present some data relating to the evolution of Turkey’s international 
trade in manufacturing goods. As it is apparent from the table, while there has been an 
immediate surge in the share of Turkish imports originating from the EU15 countries 
after the signing of the CU agreement, for both exports and imports there has been no 
noticeable difference in the  share of trade (exports plus imports) that Turkey is 
conducting with the EU15 between 1995 and 2003; the share of  Turkish exports 
destined for the EU15 countries has increased slightly, whereas the share of Turkish 
imports originating from the EU15 has decreased. A likely explanation for this 
(somehow paradoxical) trend in the Turkish trade with the EU15 is the increased 
participation of the formerly centrally planned economies in both Europe and Asia in 
the world trading system. Nevertheless, even by looking at these raw data one can 
observe the trade diversion caused by the EU-Turkey CU by noting that the share of 
Turkish total trade (imports plus exports) conducted with the EU15 fell by less than 
two percentage points between 1995 and 2003, whereas the corresponding decline in 
the share of Turkish trade with the United States and Japan were seven percentage 
points.   9
1989 1995 1996 2003 1989 1995 1996 2003
Austria 1,37% 1,00% 1,53% 1,40% 1,00% 1,02% 1,11% 0,94%
Belgium-Luxembourg 3,66% 2,78% 2,89% 2,92% 2,38% 2,04% 2,01% 1,88%
Denmark 0,33% 0,62% 0,43% 0,53% 0,69% 0,64% 0,66% 1,00%
Finland 0,85% 0,80% 0,65% 0,79% 0,27% 0,17% 0,18% 0,45%
France 5,58% 6,80% 7,60% 7,02% 5,32% 4,69% 4,53% 6,07%
Germany 19,59% 17,83% 21,31% 15,77% 20,22% 23,73% 23,12% 16,00%
Greece 0,69% 0,43% 0,50% 0,49% 0,99% 0,91% 1,00% 1,88%
Ireland 0,17% 0,67% 0,41% 0,85% 0,20% 0,24% 0,28% 0,59%
Italy 9,43% 11,05% 12,09% 9,13% 8,95% 6,51% 5,99% 6,61%
Netherlands 3,07% 2,80% 3,14% 2,41% 3,53% 3,37% 3,19% 3,17%
Portugal 0,08% 0,23% 0,23% 0,26% 0,09% 0,26% 0,26% 0,68%
Spain 2,09% 2,06% 2,92% 3,39% 0,85% 1,49% 1,49% 3,77%
Sweden 1,41% 1,75% 1,80% 1,29% 0,71% 0,47% 0,53% 1,00%
United Kingdom 5,94% 5,98% 6,73% 5,53% 5,99% 5,37% 5,59% 8,04%
EU15 54,26% 54,79% 62,22% 51,78% 51,21% 50,91% 49,93% 52,08%
CEEC 1,65% 0,91% 0,75% 2,79% 0,83% 2,76% 2,13% 2,66%
United States 11,45% 10,45% 7,66% 4,19% 6,77% 6,83% 6,35% 8,05%
Japan 4,75% 4,89% 4,02% 3,28% 1,63% 0,63% 0,57% 0,24%
Russian (Federation of) 0,00% 4,28% 2,45% 6,26% 0,00% 6,33% 6,90% 2,61%
China 0,30% 1,81% 1,54% 4,27% 0,50% 0,21% 0,24% 0,96%
OECD 78,17% 77,62% 81,47% 70,29% 63,05% 63,29% 61,31% 64,61%
Total non-OECD 21,83% 21,38% 17,64% 28,10% 36,92% 34,61% 36,56% 30,85%
Total World 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00%
                                     MANUFACTURING TRADE
Shares of Turkish Imports from  Shares of Turkish Exports to
Source: OECD STAN Bilateral Trade  
                                                           Table 1: Turkish Foreign Trade  
The completion in 1995 of the CU, in accordance with the provision of the Agreement 
was considered by the Commision to be of prime importance for the increased 
integration between the EU and Turkey. Twelve years later than its application for EU 
membership,  Turkey  was officially recognised as an EU candidate at the Helsinki 
summit in December 1999, and in December 2002 the European Council announced 
that if it deems that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria it 
would  open negotiations without delay. In October 2004 the European Commission 
concluded that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, and at the December 2004 
Brussels European Council it was decided that accession negotiations will open with 
Turkey in October 2005. In the meantime, the Commission's objective of “extending 
and deepening” the Customs Union (CU) was endorsed by EU Member States at the 
December 2002 Copenhagen Council. In order to advance the CU, Turkey and the EU 
are pushing ahead to deepen it into new areas such as services and public procurement. 
The Council has agreed on negotiating guidelines on the liberalisation of services and   10
public procurement. Several rounds of negotiations have so far taken place, whereas in 
other areas, such as the requirement to align with the Community's preferential 
customs regimes, the EU has been encouraging Turkey to make further advances.  
  3.   Theoretical Framework 
The differential effects on the EU(15) countries of the EU-Turkey CU can arise either 
when trade involves the exchange of homogeneous goods, or when trade involves the 
exchange of vertically-differentiated products. Since the logic behind the differential 
impact differs in the two cases, we briefly present the underlying mechanisms of each 
case in the rest of this section.  In order to focus on the issues which we want to 
highlight we consider for both cases a partial equilibrium framework of an existing 
customs union model involving four countries (or regions): the North (N) and the 
South (S) of the EU(15),  Turkey (T) and the rest of the world (R). We start our 
analysis by assuming the existence of a CU between North and South. We assume that 
there are no technical, regulatory or other cost-increasing trade barriers within the CU, 
but that there is a common external tariff (CET) which it is applied on imports from 
either T or R.  We assume away the existence of (differential) transport costs between 
the four countries and of any other trade barriers, except the per-unit CET, t .  
3.1 Homogeneous Goods 
 
We assume the existence of a homogeneous good, X, which is produced in both the 
North and South of the EU(15) and it is imported from both Turkey and the rest of the 
world. We start our analysis by considering the case that the North is a net importer of 
X, whereas the South exports (along with T and R) this good to N.  In Figure 1, we 
depict the import-demand curve of N (the difference between domestic demand and 
supply) as N M , whereas the the export supply curves (the difference between domestic 
supply and demand) of S, T, and R are depicted as  , ST EE , and  R E  (respectively). The 
fact that the export supply elasticities of S and T are finite implies that the source of 
imports for this good will be both by the customs union partner and the outside world – 
see Panagariya (2000) for a similar assumption involving the formation of a CU by 
two countries.     11
Due to the existence of a customs union between N and S, initially N imposes a per-
unit tariff at rate t on imports from both T and R only. This implies that the relevant 
export supply curves for T and R are depicted by  T
t E and  R
t E , respectively
5. The price 
paid by consumers in both N and S will be equal to  C
t P , and N’s total imports will be 
equal to OF, with quantity OB sourced from S, quantity BC sourced from Turkey, and 
quantity CF sourced from the rest of the world. Following the expansion of the CU to 
include Turkey, T’s export-supply curve shifts downwards (by the amount of the tariff) 
to T E . We assume that the common external tariff remains unchanged after T becomes 
part of the CU. Since, by construction, N continues to import from R as well after the 
CU expansion, the (consumer’s) price within the CU remains unaltered at C
t P . In this 
case N’s aggregate volume of imports does not expand. Nevertheless, quantity  CD is 
diverted away from the more efficient R to the less efficient T, and quantity AB is 
directed away from the less efficient S to the more efficient T. Accordingly, T’s 
exports expand to AD, to the detriment of both S’s and R’s exports to N.  
 
Figure 1: CU expansion with homogeneous goods 
 
An important caveat is in order here. As far as the welfare effects of the CU expansion 
are concerned, we note that in this particular case, and assuming that full employment 
                                                 
5 The horizontal axis depicts the price paid by the buyer of the good. 
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prevails in all countries and that no other distortions are in place, there would be a loss 
of tariff revenue (equal to the area cmnd) for N and a loss of producer’s surplus (equal 
to afge) for S. The gain to T’s producers is the sum of areas afgb and cmn. The net 
effect on the expanded CU’s welfare is ambiguous, since it depends positively on the 
size of area aeb and negatively on the size of area cnd.  We thus observe that both N 
and S lose in this case, and this obviously would also be the case if S had been an 
importer of good X and N an exporter of this good (in which case S would lose tariff 
revenue and N would lose producer’s surplus). For goods which either N and/or S 
export to T, there will be a rise in producer surplus for both countries. Thus, the 
welfare effects of the CU expansion appear symmetric for N and S even though the 
effects on trade are asymmetric. However, the presence of high levels of 
unemployment for many EU countries implies that the preceding welfare analysis is 
incomplete. This is because it assumes that, for example, an increase in a country’s 
exports (and production) has no effect on aggregate employment, with the expanding 
sector’s increase in employment coming at the expense of reduced employment in 
other sectors. We not only believe that this is a far-fetched assumption for most EU 
countries,  but we are also confident that this is not the framework used by political, 
business or trade union leaders when thinking about the effects of trade policy.
6 We 
conclude that for both normative and pragmatic reasons the traditional focus on 
welfare effects which do not take into account of employment effects is misplaced, and 
that our focus on trade volume asymmetries is a sensible first step towards the 
identification of an important component of the welfare asymmetries of CU expansion 
in distorted economies.   
 
Although Figure 1 is highly specific, we can still use it to draw some more general 
conclusions. First, we note that had S been an importer of good X and N an exporter of 
this good, it would have been N’s exports to S that would have been displaced by the 
expansion of the CU to include T.  Second, for goods in which N and/or S are net 
exporters to T, the expansion of the CU to include T will generate an increase in their 
exports to T (at the expense of R’s exports), and thus cause an increase in the 
producer’s surplus for these countries. To the extent that the increase in S’s and N’s 
                                                 
6 The assumption of the absence of any distortions implies that countries can increase their welfare by 
taxing their exports, thus harming their trade partners. It is interesting that neither GATT nor the WTO  
prohibit a country from taxing its exports (which they should do since it creates negative externalities 
for the importing countries), although countries have found it worthwhile to bound their import tariffs.    13
exports to Turkey is of similar  value to the decline of their exports to each other, the 
CU expansion would not have any significant asymmetric effects on N and S as far as 
the volume of exports is concerned.  
        
The possibility of asymmetric effects can arise if, to pick an extreme example, for the 
goods (call this group of goods, X) in which S is an exporter, T is also an exporter (i.e., 
its revealed comparative advantage is in the same group of goods) whereas for the 
goods (call this group Z) in which N is an exporter, T is an importer. In this case, the 
expansion of the CU to include T would largely imply that the increase of T’s exports 
to N would be at the expense of S’s exports to N, whereas N’s exports to S would not 
be affected
7. To put the issue bluntly, if the South is an exporter of agricultural goods, 
then its exports to North would be reduced as a result of the CU expansion to include a 
country which, by assumption, is mainly an exporter of agricultural goods, whereas the 
North’s exports of manufacturing goods to the South will not be curtailed as the new 
entrant does not have comparative advantage in the production of these goods.   We 
thus expect that to the extent that there are differences in the degree of export 
similarity between Turkey and the countries of EU (15), this would be an important 
factor which could explain the (possible) presence of asymmetric effects on the 
volume of exports across the fifteen EU countries.     
 
3.2 Vertically Differentiated Products 
 
We now assume that the four countries trade in a vertically differentiated product
8. We 
start our analysis by assuming that within each country the vertically differentiated 
product, Y, is produced under perfectly competitive conditions by identical firms. 
(This assumption is not necessary for our analysis, but it greatly simplifies it; we 
discuss later the case of infra-marginal firms.) This good is differentiated according to 
quality, which is measured by an index Q in the range [1,∞]. We assume that there is 
perfect information regarding the quality index. We further assume that production 
costs in all countries depend on quality and that each unit of a given quality is 
                                                 
7 The welfare consequences of the CU expansion would also be asymmetric for the incumbent CU 
members in this case, but it is not clear that they would be worse for S than the N. In any case, the 
possible presence of other distortions (e.g., unemployment) makes the proper calculation of welfare 
effects beyond the scope of the present paper.  
8 This section relies heavily on Adam and Moutos (2004).    14
produced at a constant cost (which differs across countries). We capture the above 










=    0, 1 NN γ ε >> ,                                                                              (1) 
where  () N YQ  denotes the number of units of quality Q produced in North,  N L stands 
for the (effective) units of labor used in the production process, and  N γ  and  N ε  are 
parameters. Our assumption that  N ε >1 implies that although costs per unit in terms of 
quantity are constant, increases in quality are associated with more than 
equiproportional increases in unit costs. This assumption is motivated by the fact that 
increases in quality – for a given state of technological capability – require the 
employment of an increasing number of workers. These workers must be allocated not 
only to the production of a higher number of features attached to each good (e.g. 
electric windows, air bags, ABS, security devices, etc. in the case of automobiles) that 
directly absorb labor, but also to the development and refinement of these features as 
well. We assume that these endeavors are subject to diminishing returns (see also, 
Flam and Helpman (1987)).  
 
Equation (1) implies that the average cost at which each unit of quality Q will be 
produced by Northern producers is   
   () N
NN N ACQ w Q
ε γ = ,                                                                                             (2) 
where  N w  is the Northern wage rate.  We now assume that the North has absolute 
advantage in the production of every quality level of the differentiated good over the 
South, and that its comparative advantage (CA) lies in the production of high-quality 
varieties of the differentiated good. These assumptions are reflected in the following 










=       , SN γ γ >       SN ε ε >                                                                     (3) 
According to equation (3) the average cost at which each unit of quality Q will be 
produced by Southern producers will be 
S
SS S ACwQ ε γ =                                                                                                          (4)  
where  S w  is the Southern wage rate. Under these conditions it is obvious that if the 
wage rates (per effective unit of labour) were equal in the two countries, Southern   15
producers would not be able to produce any varieties at a lower cost (price) than their 
Northern counterparts. For this reason, we assume that wages in the South are 
sufficiently lower than Northern wages, i.e. that  NS ww > . This assumption guarantees 
that Southern producers will be able to produce at least some low-quality varieties 
(those ones in which the country has CA) at a lower cost than Northern producers.   
 
With respect to the rest of the world, we assume that R represents the most 
technologically sophisticated country in the world, whereas T is less technologically 
sophisticated than South. This stark assumption is made as a way of capturing the 
different levels of technological sophistication between R and T, by placing them on 
the opposite sites of technological sophistication relative to the North and South (the 
evidence presented later in the paper is supportive of this assumption). The production 



















=                , TS γ γ >          TS ε ε >                                                                (6) 
 
and the associated average cost functions  as  
()
R
RR R ACQ w Q
ε γ =                                               (7)                              
()
T
TT T AC Q w Q
ε γ = .                                                                                                      (8) 
 
Our assumptions about technology dictate that a necessary condition for each country 
to be able to produce some varieties of the differentiated good at a lower cost than the 
other countries is that wages are lowest in T and highest in R, that is 
RNST wwww >>> . In Figure 2 we depict the relationship between average cost and 
quality for the four countries. The assumption that T has the lowest wage allows this 
country to produce at the lowest cost all varieties with quality in the range [1,  TS Q ]. 
This is a manifestation of the assumption that T has comparative advantage in low-
quality varieties of the differentiated good.  
   16

















We define  TS Q as the market-dividing quality level between T’s and S’s producers. On 
the other hand, R will be the least cost producer for varieties with quality greater 
than, NR Q  i.e., R has comparative advantage in very high-quality varieties. Similarly, 
the South’s and the North’s comparative advantage is restricted to middle-quality 
varieties and high-quality varieties, i.e. those ones with quality in the ranges [ , TS SN QQ] 
and [ , SN NR QQ ] , with  SN Q   and  NR Q  being the market-dividing quality levels between 
Southern and Northern producers, and Northern and rest of the world (ROW) 
producers, respectively. From Figure 1 it also becomes obvious that the “competitive 
threat” to a country’s producers is only from those foreign producers, which have 
comparative advantage in supplying contiguous (in terms of quality) varieties. 
 
The above representation of technological differences between countries is an attempt 
to capture the “average” situation in terms of vertical product specialization between 
the countries involved. It is obvious that there are some products for which Turkey 
may have comparative advantage in producing higher quality varieties than the EU 











Figure 2: Cost-quality schedules 
a
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foreign direct investment (FDI) from (mainly) EU countries. In many cases FDI is 
associated with the international fragmentation of the production process (see, Jones 
(2000)). In these instances, a country may acquire a comparative advantage in 
producing high quality varieties of some intermediate inputs (components), without 
necessarily having comparative advantage in the production of high quality varieties of 
other components or of the final product. There is indeed evidence that such processes 
may have been  at work in Turkey, but, as yet (circa 2002), the contribution of FDI to 
the upgrading of domestically produced varieties has not raised average quality to the 
level observed in the least technologically advanced EU countries
9.   
 
3. 2.1   The Effects of Customs Union Expansion 
 
International trade between the four countries will involve the exchange of different 
quality varieties – since, for example, there will be some low-income Northern EU 
residents wishing to consume low quality varieties produced at the lowest cost in T, 
and some very-high income households in T wishing to buy varieties which are 
produced at the lowest cost in R. The distribution of income thus plays a crucial role in 
the analysis in that households with identical preference structures may nevertheless 
consume varieties produced in different countries if they have different incomes.  
 
We start our analysis by assuming the existence of a CU between N and S, and that 
there is a CET, t . In Figure 3 , we depict the consequences of an enlargement of the 
CU between N and S, to include T. Before the enlargement, the price schedule facing 
consumers in N and S is depicted by the kinked line abcde. The curves  T p t +  and 
R p t +  depict the tariff inclusive prices that producers in T and R charge to N’s and S’s 
consumers. Under these circumstances, the range of varieties, which T will be 
exporting to N and S, will be up to 
0
TS Q , whereas R will be exporting to N and S all 
varieties with quality greater than NR Q .  After the accession of T to the CU, the price 
schedule and the budget constraint facing N’s  and S’s consumers are given by the 
                                                 
9 Flam (2003) notes that the amount of FDI flows to the Turkish economy is far below the level attracted by 
the more successful CEECs. Indeed, for the period 1995-2000, the total FDI inflows to Turkey were 
4,079 million euros, whereas the FDI inflows to Poland (whose population is less than 60% of Turkey’s 
population) amount to 25,526 million euros (Eurostat (2002)). According to UNCTAD (2002), Turkey 
has one of the lowest rankings in terms of its potential for FDI inflows. Nevertheless, FDI inflows to 
Turkey are expected to increase as the day of full EU membership draws closer.    18
kinked line fgcde in both Figures. The range of varieties which now T exports to N and 
S expands up to 
1
TS Q , whereas S’s range of varieties that it supplies at the lowest cost 
in the N’s and S’s market (the EU15 market) diminishes by the same amount (e.g. 
distance 
0
TS Q  
1


































 In Figure 4 we depict the consequences of the CU for Turkey’s market. S’s export 
share in this market increases at the expense of local production – the range of South’s 




TS. The N’s export share in Turkey’s market 




NR.   
In summary, the enlargement to include T into the CU results in an increase in   
Northern  and Southern  exports to T and an increase of T’s exports to N and S. 
However, the increase in T’s exports is done at the expense of South’s producers only. 
Higher sales of T’s producers into the EU’s market displace only Southern produced 
varieties – North’s exports (and sales in the domestic market) do not decline
10.     
                                                 
10 The model could be easily amended to accommodate the existence of (economic) profits in two ways. 

























Figure 4: CU expansion with  




4.  Empirical Analysis  
 
In order to empirically assess the effects of the customs union between the EU and 
Turkey on the export performance of each EU(15) country to the other fourteen 
countries, we estimated a gravity model comprising of all fifteen  EU countries for the 
                                                                                                                                             
some of them being more productive than others (a model of pure competition). The more productive 
firms will be earning profits in equilibrium (infra-marginal firms), and they will be interested in an 
expansion of demand, which would allow higher cost firms to enter the industry  thereby raising the 
equilibrium price above the average cost of infra-marginal firms and allowing them to increase their 
profits further. Second, and more realistically, we can consider a model of oligopoly in which firms 
choose the price-quality combination, which maximizes profits. In this model, the elimination of tariffs 
on imports from E results in reductions in the prices that G, D and R firms charge to consumers in the 
incumbent countries, in an effort to maintain their market share. Despite these complications, the 
prediction of the competitive model (that the North’s net exports increase if T accedes to the CU) 
remains intact.     20
period 1988–2002.
11 The time period was chosen to ensure availability and reliability 
of sectoral data for the entire country sample (including Turkey), and to exclude the 
effects of  previous enlargments (or customs union agreements) of the EU.
12    
 
According to our theoretical framework, we examine the effects of the EU- Turkey 
agreement on the exports of each EU15 country i to the rest of the EU15 countries (we 
denote this as Xi,EU15-i ).  We estimate a gravity equation of the following form: 
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Xi,EU15-i,t  =  Log of the real manufacturing exports of country i to EU15-i 
YitYEU15-i,t  =  Log of real GDP of country i at time t times real GDP EU15-i 
PjtPEU15-i,t  =  Log of population of country i at time t times population EU15-i 
dREERit  =  Rate of change of the Real Effective Exchange Rate of country i  
CEEC  =  Dummy, equal to 1 after 1993 or the Exports of the CEECs to the 
EU15-i market 
µi, EU15-i   =  Time Invariant- Country Specific effect 
λt  =  Country Invariant- Time Specific effect.  
 
Exports data are taken from OECD’s STAN Bilateral Trade database. The coverage of 
the STAN data begins in 1988 and the latest year available is 2002. The REER data are 
taken from OECD’s Main Economic Indicators and GDP and population data are taken 
from OECD’s Economic Outlook. In a typical gravity model, besides the so- called 
“gravity” variables (i.e., real income and population), a series of dummies and time 
invariant variables are included, i.e. distance, common language, border dummies, 
common currency, etc. Moreover, during the time period under consideration (1988-
2002) there were major developments in the world economy that have also affected the 
intra- EU trade flows, eg., the rise of China as an important actor in the world trading 
system, and the integration of  the CEECs in the world economy. This implies that our 
econometric model will be correctly specified only if we include a series of time 
                                                 
11 Despite its simplicity, the gravity model is widely used in empirical trade theory since it fits well to 
any theory of international trade from Heckscher-Ohlin to new trade theories (see, Deardorff (1998)). 
12 The Customs Union between the EU and Austria, Finland and Sweden had been formed well before 
1993 (which is the date of entry of these three countries to the EU).   21
specific- country invariant variables to account for these shocks. Since the list of both 
the time invariant and the country invariant variables can be rather exhaustive, we take 
the simplest shortcut by assuming that the correct specification of our panel data model 
is a Fixed- Effects, Two Way Error Component model
13. Accordingly, the country 
specific fixed effects, µiEU15-i,  include all the time invariant variables (distance, 
common language etc.), whereas the time specific fixed effects, λt, include all the 
country invariant “shocks” to world trade. The proper estimator for our model then is 
the two- way within estimator, that wipes out µi,EU15-i and λt. The Fixed-Effects, Two-
Way error component model is also supported both by our econometric testing (i.e. a 
Hausman test that rejects the null of the random effects in favour of the fixed effects 
estimator), and by an F- test that shows that the country and time specific effects are 
statistically significant in all estimated equations (see also Mátyás 1997, 1998). We 




According to the gravity equation, the “normal” amount of trade among two countries 
depends on the product of the size of their economies and on the economic, geographic 
and cultural distance between the two economies. The trade creating or diverting 
effects of a CU agreement are usually measured by adding a dummy variable for the 
participation in the agreement (see, Frankel (1997)). However this may not constitute a 
correct empirical strategy in our case for the following two reasons.
15 First, the EU- 
Turkey CU agreement came into effect in 1996, whereas the EU- CEECs agreements 
(the so-called Europe Agreements) started coming into effect from 1994 onwards
16 and 
their trade creating effect for the CEECs became gradually apparent in the following 
years (see Adam et al (2004) for a discussion). Thus allowing for a dummy variable to 
measure the effect of the EU- Turkey agreement may not be appropriate since the 
                                                 
13 The dependent variable is exports of each country to the EU15-i market. In this case the bilateral 
fixed effect µi,EU14-i is equivalent to having separate country i and country j fixed effects, as in Baltagi et. 
al. (2003).  
14 This is consistent also with the trade theoretic methodology where all variables affecting trade are 
expressed in relative terms. 
15 Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that we have verified that the qualitative nature of our empirical 
findings remains unaltered to following this strategy. Table A1 in the appendix shows the econometric 
results for this case.  
16 The Europe Agreements for Hungary and Poland entered into force on 1 February 1994, and those for 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, and the Slovak Republic on 1 February 1995. Bilateral free-
trade agreements were also signed with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1994, which came into effect in 
1995.    22
effects of the EU- Turkey agreement would potentially coincide with the effects of the 
Europe Agreements. Second, the EU- Turkey agreement did not involve immediate 
liberalization of trade for all sectors, but instead it involved for most of them a gradual 
liberalization strategy.  
 
For these reasons we have decided to derive endogenously a measure for the increase 
in EU-Turkey trade that can be attributed to their CU. In order to do this we proceed as 
follows. First, we estimate a similar gravity model as in equation (9) for the 1988- 
1995 period, with Turkey’s exports to EU15-i as the dependent variable. We then use 
the estimated coefficients in order to perform an out-of-sample prediction for the 1996-
2002 period in order to find the “normal” amount of exports of Turkey to EU15-i (i.e., 
our  prediction for the amount of exports which would obtain if the CU agreement did 
not take place). As a final step, we measure the impact of the CU agreement as the 
difference between the actual and the predicted values of  Turkey’s exports to EU15-i 
for the 1996-2002 period.
17 This is variable TUR in equation (9) 
18. We expect this 
variable to have a  negative impact on the exports of country i to the EU15-i, due to the 
displacement of intra-EU15 trade that the granting of preferetial access to Turkey’s 
exports to the EU should generate. Nevertheless, what is more important according to 
our theoretical priors, is the possibility of  an assymetric effect across the EU15 
countries, depending on their degree of export similarity with Turkey and their level of 
technological sophistication. We implement this below by allowing for the coefficient 
of this variable to vary across the low technology and high technology countries.  
 
In Table 2 we present the results when we allow for a homogeneous effect of the extra 
Turkish exports to EU15 on the exports of each of the EU15 countries to the other 14 
countries (same γ across for all EU15 countries). In Table 2 we also report the Random 
Effects estimates of the model. The comparison of the outcomes of both estimations is 
a natural test of the robustness of the results. All variables have the expected sign. 
                                                 
17 Of course one may expect that the difference between predicted and actual exports may be affected by 
time specific effects, for the reasons mentioned in connection to the specification of equation (9). 
However, since our method for computing TUR involves the estimation of the model only for the 1988- 
1995 period, it is not possible to have an estimate of the time effects for the 1996- 2002 period. To 
capture as much as possible the time specific effects for this period, we include in the equation for 
Turkey a common time trend.    
18 We cannot perform the same procedure for the CEECs since there are no available bilateral trade data 
for these countries before 1991.    23
Since trade is expected to increase with size and per capita income, β1 and β2 are 
positive and negative respectively. Furthermore the estimated coefficients β1, β2 are 
very close to the ones obtained in the literature and consistent with the growth in world 
trade during the last 50 years (see, Frankel (1997)).  What is worth noting is that the 
Europe Agreements seem to have had, on average, a low and statistically insignificant 
effect on the intra-EU exports. This may be because the Europe Agreements started 
coming into effect in 1994, and their effect was gradually becoming more significant. 
It is thus likely that much of the CEEC effect on intra-EU15 exports has been captured 
by the time specific effects introduced into our model. The influence of the real 
exchange rate is also found to be insignificant, a result which can be explained by the 
fact that most of the EU15 countries were participating in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism, and there have been small differences in the behaviour of their 
(multilateral) real exchange rate indices during this period.    
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R square 0.46 0.50
F test model 8.21
Chi-2 model 76.56
F test country 33.26




Note:Two way Fixed Effects and Random Effects,  t statistics in 
the parenthesis. *=10%,**=5%,***=1% significance.  
Table 2: Gravity Model Estimation, Exports to the EU15 Market 
 
The results in Table 2 suggest that, as expected, the increased integration of Turkey 
with the EU decreased the exports of each of the EU15 countries to the other 14 
countries by a negligible amount: combining the average value of the TUR variable 
(i.e., the above normal increase in Turkish exports to the EU during the 1996-2002   24
period), which is about 11%, with the estimated coefficient for this variable
19, we find 
that the EU- Turkey CU has resulted in a negligible reduction (about one thirtienth of 




We now proceed to test for the existence of asymmetric effects on the exports of each 
of the EU15 countries to the rest of EU. To test for this asymmetry we assume that the 
coefficient γ in equation (9) is not the same for all EU15 countries. We expect that for 
the group of countries that face more competition from Turkey and have a lower 
technological sophistication, the Turkish accession will have a greater (negative) effect 
on their exports. To identify such a group we develop measures reflecting the degree of 
competition that countries face from Turkey as well as a measure of the technological  
sophistication of each EU15 country.      
 
To measure the degree of competition between each of the  EU15 countries and 
Turkey,  we use a measure of the extent to which Turkey’s exports overlap with the 
exports of each EU15 country as in Finger and Kreinin (1979) and Lee (1997): 
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This index measures the degree of export similarity (ES) between Turkey and each EU 
country i regarding their exports to the rest of the EU15 countries. EXj,i, EU15-i is the 
share of manufacturing commodity group j in the total manufacturing exports of 
country i (or T for Turkey) to the EU15-i. To compute this index we used the 
disaggregated SITC 4 digit data taken from OECD’s ITCS Trade by Commodity 
Database
21, which involve 533 product groups, for the time period 1995- 2002 for each 
                                                 
19 The TUR coefficient is considered robust since it has the same sign, magnitude and statistical 
significance in the Random Effects model as well.  
20 In all the estimations that follow we are reporting the estimated change in exports according to the 
point estimates of TUR. However the coefficient of TUR belongs to a confidence interval and the size of 
this interval depends on the standard error of TUR. Accordingly, the estimated change in exports 
(coefficient of TUR times the value of TUR) will also fall within a confidence interval the size of which 
depends on the size of the confidence interval of TUR. Nevertheless, our finding of asymmetries in this 
paper should be considered robust since the difference in the TUR coefficients between the North and 
the South is statistically different from zero.  
21 As available online in http://www.sourceoecd.com   25
EU15 country
22. Lower values of ES correspond to a more identical commodity 
distribution of exports and thus higher competition in the common EU market.  
 
In Figure 5 we depict the average value of the ES index for each EU15 country vis-à-
vis Turkey the period 1995-2002. Figure 5 suggests that the countries whose exports 
overlap most with Turkish exports in the EU market are Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain 











































                                           Figure 5: Manufacturing Export Similarity 
 
We now proceed to  construct a measure of  technological sophistication for each of 
the EU15 countries and Turkey. To do so, we used 5- digit data of world 
manufacturing exports (SITC categories 5 to 8, which include a total of 1023 
industries) and imports of each country, taken from OECD’s ITCS Trade by 
Commodity Database. Then for each industry j we computed the trade overlap index 
defined as: 
                                                 
22 The export similarity index appearing in equation (10) has the advantage that it is semi- metric and it 
is equivalent to the Bray- Curtis semi- metric index which has been largely used also in the natural 
sciences (De Benedictis and Tajoli, 2003). An alternative measure one could use to measure the 
similarity of exports of two countries is the Pearson’s coefficient of correlation between the export 
shares of each industry of country i and T. This measure however is rather inappropriate since the export 











where Mijt and Xijt are world imports and exports of product j in country i at time t 
respectively. When the TOIijt is greater than 10% the exports of industry j are classified 
as Intra- Industry Exports. We then calculated the average unit value of exports to 
imports for all industries of country i at time t, for all industries that are involved in 
intra-industry trade. Industries for which this ratio was greater than 1.15, were 
classified as industries involved in the exportation of high-quality, vertically-
differentiated products (see, Greenaway et al. (1995)). Industries for which this ratio 
was below 0.85, their exports were classified as low-quality exports. For all remaining 
industries (those with relative unit values between 0.85 and 1.15), their exports were 
considered to be same-quality exports (i.e., these industries were involved in trade in 
horizontally differentiated products). Adding up the manufacturing exports of all high-
quality industries and dividing them by the total amount of the vertically-differentiated 
manufacturing exports of country i, we obtained a measure of technological 
sophistication for country i at year t, i.e. the share of high-quality manufacturing 
exports to total vertically-differentiated manufacturing exports. In Table 3, the first 
column presents the average 1995-2002 value of this index with higher values 
implying superior technology. The second column ranks all EU15 countries and 
Turkey according to the average 1995-2002 value of this technology index. In the third 
column of Table1 we rank the EU15 countries according to their export similarity 
index (the average for the 1995-2002 period), with higher values in the ranking 
implying a higher export similarity with Turkey. 







Germany   0.790 1 7
Ireland   0.754 2 1
UK 0.740 3 5
Denmark   0.734 4 6
BLEU 0.731 5 8
Netherlands   0.722 6 3
Sweden   0.698 7 4
Austria   0.687 8 9
France   0.681 9 10
Finland   0.533 10 2
Greece   0.531 11 13
Italy   0.465 12 12
Spain   0.431 13 11
Portugal   0.403 14 14
Turkey 0.243 15 -----  
Table 3: Country technology and export similarity rankings 
 
From Table 3 we see that not only Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal have the lowest 
technology ranking among the EU15, but they are also the countries for which their 
export pattern is the most similar to Turkey’s
23. We will term this group of countries as 
South 1. Table 3 also reveals that France’s  positioning in both the technology  and 
export similarity rankings, may justify its inclusion in the South. We term the group 
consisting of the South 1 countries plus France, as South 2. 
 
In Table 4 we present the results of estimating the same gravity model, but this time 
we allow γ to vary between the two country groups (North and South). We expect that 
the negative effect of the EU-Turkey CU –as far as the intra-EU15 exports are 
concerned- will be more pronounced for the South than for the North. In the top part of 
the Table 3,  we report the coefficients for the North. The coefficients for the South are 
expressed as deviations from the North. As Table 4 reveals, the effect on the South 
(either South1, or South2) is significantly different from that of North. For the South 
the effect of an increase in the Turkish exports to EU15 is negative and statistically 
significant (at the 1% level), whereas for the Northern countries it is both economically 
                                                 
23 It must be mentioned that these “technology rankings” by no means should be interpreted as reflecting 
a country’s overall level of technological sophistication, but only as a measure of the relative 
technological sophistication of their exports. For example, Greece does not possess the technological 
capacity to produce passenger cars at a quality-cost combination which would make them attractive to 
either the domestic or foreign markets. Yet, countries that do have this technological capacity (eg., Italy 
or Spain) export –on average-  lower-priced varieties than they import, and this has a negative impact on 
the technology ranking of these countries (especially if this commodity brings in  a significant amount 
of export earnings).     28
negligible and statistically insignificant. The estimated coefficients imply that a 1% 
increase in Turkey’s exports to the EU15 above their “normal” level results into a 
0.26% reduction in the average exports of each of the Southern countries to the rest of 
the EU15. Moreover all coefficients of interest (TUR, south1 TUR and South2 TUR) 
can be considered robust as they have the same sign and significance when the model 
is estimated with Random Effects.  
 
YiYj 1.089*** 1.066*** 0.842*** 0.824***
(5.42) (5.26) (5.32) (5.19)
PiPj -1.716*** -1.746*** -0.167 -0.158
-(3.69) -(3.75) -(0.73) -(0.69)
dREER 0.372 0.389 0.335 0.348
(1.23) (1.28) (1.07) (1.1)
CEEC -0.180 -0.147 -0.255* -0.233*
-(1.00) -(0.82) -(1.93) -(1.78)
TUR -0.035 -0.050 -0.046 -0.061
-(0.38) -(0.55) -(0.56) -(0.73)
south1 TUR -0.228*** -0.221***
-(2.62) -(2.62)
south2 TUR -0.201** -0.193**
-(2.31) -(2.28)
R square 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.37
F test model 8.05 7.90
Chi2 model 110.42 134.26
F test country 292.67 291.00
F test time 2.41 2.36
Hausman FE 20.64 20.76
obs 203 203 203 203
Note:Two way Fixed Effects and Random Effects,  t statistics in the parenthesis. 
*=10%,**=5%,***=1% significance.




Table 4: Exports to EU14 market, different coefficients 
In order to assess the magnitude of the EU- Turkey CU effect on the exports of the 
South, we computed the average value of the increase in the exports of Turkey to the 
EU15 that can be attributed to the CU (i.e., the increase in Turkey’s exports to the 
EU15 which is above their “normal” level as predicted by the gravity model); this is 
our definition of the TUR variable. When we define the South as South1, the average 
TUR is close to 26% and statistically significant. Using the point estimates from Table 
4, we find that as a result of the CU, the average exports of each country of South1 to 
the rest of the EU15 fell by about 7%. On the other hand, the impact on the average   29
value of exports of each country of the North to the rest of the EU15 is found to be 
both economically negligible and statistically insignificant at the 5% level of 
significance. When we define the South as South2, the average TUR is 25%, 
statistically significant, and it implies that the average exports of each country of 
South2 to the rest of the EU15 fell by about 6%. The corresponding effect for the 
North is again found to be both economically negligible and statistically insignificant.   
 
The above findings indicate that as far as the intra-EU exports of the EU15 are 
concerned, the EU-Turkey CU had an asymmetric effect, the nature of which is 
consistent with our theoretical framework. Yet, in order to be able to suggest that the 
distribution of the benefits (or costs) of the EU-Turkey CU is uneven among the EU15 
countries, we must examine whether the crowding-out of the intra-EU exports for the 
Southern group was not more than offset by a higher increase of its exports to Turkey.  
 
In order to do this we estimated the same gravity model (as in equation (9)) for the 
period 1989- 1995
24, with the exports of each EU15 country to Turkey as the 
dependent variable
25. The difference between actual exports and the out-of-sample 
prediction for the exports for each EU15 country to Turkey, for the period 1996-2002, 
is again taken to measure the degree of extra- penetration of the EU15 to Turkey due to 
the CU. The average value of the extra exports for each of the EU15 countries has been 
estimated to be about 26%, which is also statistically significant. Defining the South as 
South1, the average value (of the increase in the South’s exports is about 11%, which 
is also statistically significant. On the other hand the average gain for the Northern 
group of countries in this case is about 32%, this being also statistically significant. 
Moreover we cannot reject the hypothesis that the average gain of the North is higher 
than the average gain of the South. Finally, when we assume that the South is defined 
as South2, we find that the average value of the above “normal” increase of exports for 
the South is 13% and for the corresponding variable for the North is 29%. Again, we 
find that we cannot accept the hypothesis of equality in the (above “normal”) increase 
                                                 
24 Data for the exports to Turkey were not available for 1988. 
25 The results of this estimation are summarized in the appendix (table A2, column II). Also in table A2 
in the appendix we report the results of the gravity equation for the exports of each EU country to 
Turkey when we measure the effect of the Turkey- EU CU with a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 after 1996 (column I). Furthermore, columns III and IV reveal that the effects of the EU- Turkey 
CU did not have a differential impact on the South’s (vis-à-vis the North’s) exports to Turkey.      30
in the exports of North and South2, against the alternative of a higher increase in 
Northern exports.  
 
The above evidence suggests that not only the Southern group of countries had to face 
(on average) a decline in its exports to the rest of the EU15 countries as a result of the 
EU-Turkey CU – against the absence of a corresponding effect for the Northern group, 
but also the average (above “normal”) increase of exports of the Southern group to 
Turkey were smaller than for the Northern group.     
 
Finally, and as an example of how asymmetric the effects of the EU-Turkey CU can be 
on countries that occupy the opposite sides in the technological spectrum, we consider 
the effects on Germany and Greece, respectively. The effect on Germany’s exports to 
the other EU15 countries, as a result of the increase in Turkish exports to the rest of the 
EU15, is found to be both economically and statistically insignificant. The above 
“normal” increase of German exports to Turkey is estimated to be economically 
important (about 25%) and statistically significant. On the other hand, the estimated 
reduction of Greek exports to the other EU15 countries as a result of the CU is 
estimated to be about  7% (and statistically significant), whereas the (above “normal”) 




The asymmetric effects of customs union expansion identified in this paper can be 
given an alternative and possibly broader interpretation. From the theory of 
international trade it is well known that trade liberalization can have a pervasive effect 
on factor returns. For example, in the specific factors model trade liberalization 
increases the real income of factors used exclusively in the production of the 
exportable good, reduces the real income of factors not used in the production of the 
exportable good, and it has an ambiguous effect on the real income of factors used in 
the production of both importable and exportable goods. With some sleight of hand we 
can think of firms residing in the North of EU15 as being the owners of the factor 
which is used exclusively in the production of the exportable good, whereas owners of 
firms in the South of the EU15 are the owners of the factor used exclusively in the 
production of the importable good. This interpretation is made possible by the fact that   31
the South produces (and exports to the North) goods that are very similar to the goods 
exported by Turkey to the EU15 ; it is as if the South is the sector producing the 
importable good if we treat the EU15 as a single country. The asymmetric effects of 
the EU-Turkey CU identified in this paper can thus be also explained on the basis of a 
specific factors model in which the North and the South are identified as the sectors 
producing the exportable and importable goods, respectively. 
 
According to this interpretation, the majority of firm owners in the North of the EU15 
will be in favour of the EU-Turkey CU, whereas there will not be such a strong 
support among firm owners in the South. Moreover, if there is enough labour mobility 
between the two regions (or, sectors), then according to the specific factors model the 
effect on the real income of labour is ambiguous, whereas if labour mobility is limited, 
the interests of firm owners and workers will be aligned within each region (i.e., in 
regions producing mainly exportables (importables) both workers and firm owners will 
be favourable (against) the CU). If the above observations are correct, then workers in 
the North (and, obviously in the South too) would not like to see the benefits (if any) 
which the CU has afforded them being jeopardized by lower wages and/or lower social 
benefits which may be the result of Turkish worker’s migration to the North due to 
Turkey’s full accession to the EU. 
 
From a political economy perspective our analysis implies that whereas there was no 
apparent lack of political support for the EU-Turkey CU, the political support for 
Turkey’s full membership to the EU may be lacking. This may be not only because the 
governments of the EU countries do not want to see their relative power diminished as 
a result of the accession of a populous country. It may also be that the main 
beneficiaries from the EU-Turkey CU (i.e., mainly -but not exclusively- the owners of 
firms in the North of the EU) have already reaped most of the benefits due to the 
preferential access to the Turkish market that the CU has afforded to their products. 
Although these owners of specific  factors may expect further benefits from the 
establishment of a “single market” with Turkey, these benefits may not be large 
enough to persuade the governments of the EU countries to ignore the fears of their 
workers that a rise in the relative (to capital) supply of labour in a EU27 plus Turkey 
economic union, will be detrimental to their wages.         
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YiYj 1.092*** 1.062*** 1.074***
(6.75) (7.31) (7.10)
PiPj -1.717*** -2.037*** -2.027***
(-3.60) (-4.73) (-4.50)
dREER 0.493 0.539* 0.542*
(1.58) (1.93) (1.86)
CEEC 0.031 0.073 0.069
(0.38) (0.99) (0.90)






R square 0.43 0.54 0.50
F test model 7.52 11.20 9.59
F test country 317.62 300.19 293.66
F test time 4.37 5.53 5.13
Hausman FE 20.66 37.06 35.49
obs 203 203 203
DEVIATIONS FROM NORTH
Table A1: Exports to EU14 Market (TUR dummy)
Dep. Variable Log Exports to EU14
Note:Two way Fixed Effects,  t statistics in the parenthesis. 
*=10%,**=5%,***=1% significance.  
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I II III IV
YiYj 1.036*** 0.576 1.026*** 1.021***
(5.47) (1.34) (5.32) (5.32)
PiPj -1.167*** -0.567 -1.150*** -1.140***
(-4.52) (-1.41) (-4.34) (-4.31)
dREER 0.247 -0.053 0.252 0.248
(0.52) (-0.08) (0.53) (0.52)
CEEC 0.029 0.801*** 0.774*** 0.288
(0.33) (8.38) (8.56) (3.11)






R square 0.80 0.58 0.80 0.80
F test model 40.61 11.62 38.01 38.06
F test country 117.06 58.31 94.73 93.05
F test time 73.50 9.75 7.80 7.80
Hausman FE 58 20.25 58.49 82.98
obs 203 98 203 203
DEVIATIONS FROM NORTH
Table A2: Exports to Turkish Market Market
Dep. Variable Log Exports to Turkey
Note:Two way Fixed Effects,  t statistics in the parenthesis. *=10%,**=5%,***=1% significance.
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